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The Lear Corporation’s plant in Elsie, Michigan, and its union
partner, Local 1660 of the United Automobile Workers (UAW) Inter-
national Union, graphically illustrate global and national forces at play
in reaching the goals of remaining competitive while providing for
employment protection and job creation. Although the Lear Corpora-
tion in the aggregate is a conglomerate business with sales of over
U.S.$5.9 billion, each of its auto component plants faces strong pres-
sures from the corporation to demonstrate economic viability and
advantage. It also faces pressures from its community to maintain or
increase its employment base. The story of this rural plant and its
employees’ 35-year journey to remain open and to continue to be
awarded new product placements is a typical yet fascinating story for a
U.S. firm.
The Lear–Elsie and UAW Local 1660 case demonstrates the abil-
ity of collective bargaining practices and noncontractual workplace
processes to cope with changing manufacturing paradigms. Between
its opening in 1966 and the present, this plant has exemplified three
manufacturing models. From 1966 to 1996, the Lear plant was a typi-
cal mass production facility. From 1996 to 2000, the plant shifted to a
team-based work system closely aligned with the sociotechnical sys-
tems model. With the adoption of the 2000 contract with UAW Local
1660, the plant transformed itself into a lean production plant based on
the principles of the Toyota Production System (Ohno 1988). The pre-
sentation of these contextual factors will be elaborated in the final sec-
tions of this chapter, as case findings are augmented with current
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(2001) interview data. Attention now turns to the fundamentals of the
business, the facility, the collective bargaining relationship, and the
pressures toward competition and employment protection/creation at
Lear–Elsie.
DESCRIPTION OF THE BUSINESS
The Lear–Elsie plant is part of Lear Corporation, an automotive
components supplier. Lear’s goal is to supply every component of an
automobile interior in kitted modules suitable for assembly by major
automotive producers. The corporation’s worldwide sales were
U.S.$9.1 billion in 1999, and it is clearly an expert in the design of
seating systems. Lear’s major competitors in the power seating busi-
ness are Bertrand Pfaume (France), Mariner Corporation (originally
Rockwell International), and the Johnson Controls Corporation. Since
1990, four major competitors have left the power seating business.
These former competitors are Magna Corporation, Excel Corporation,
Thompson Tennessee, and the Dura Corporation. The seat and seat
component business is highly competitive worldwide.
HISTORY OF THE FACILITY
Elsie, Michigan, is a town of 700 people, located about 28 miles
northeast of Lansing and about 110 miles northwest of Detroit, the
major industrial area in the state. It is a farming community with a
focus on dairy production and beef cattle. The Lear plant is the only
major manufacturing employer in this town.
The plant opened in 1966 and was privately owned. During the
1966–1972 period, it made door latches, hood latches, and manual seat
adjusters. The plant was sold to International Telephone and Telegraph
(ITT) Automotive in 1973. ITT, which eventually became a division of
United Technologies, aggressively pursued power seat assembly and
power window regulator business. In the mid 1990s, ITT reconceptual-
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ized its business strategies to focus on rate of return and broke up its
automotive group. Lear purchased the plant in 1997.
Lear’s business strategy was and is to earn an acceptable rate of
return while maximizing its share in the market for vehicle interiors.
Local 1660 of the UAW represented the employees through all of these
ownership changes and had to work through the necessary transitions.
Financial results from the first quarter of 1999 indicate that this strat-
egy has been successful for Lear, as the company increased earnings by
6.3 percent compared with the first quarter of 1999.
This Lear–Elsie plant currently manufactures power seat track
assemblies, seat frames, torsion bars, and seat recliner mechanisms.
Customers include Ford, General Motors, Daimler Chrysler, Saturn,
and Toyota. The power seat track assemblies must be assembled to
meet high customer standards. Because the driver’s and passenger’s
seats are fitted onto these power seat tracks, any squeaks, noise, or
wobble in their operation is likely to be immediately noticed by cus-
tomers as a defect. The plant also has a repair shop capable of repairing
seat track assemblies damaged in accidents or returned for other rea-
sons.
The Lear–Elsie plant currently employs about 500 unionized pro-
duction employees called process specialists, 15 skilled trades employ-
ees, 15 unit advisors (formerly supervisors), 8–10 clerical people, and
about 8 material analysts and quality analysts in addition to the upper
tier of managers. Employment levels have varied widely, though. In
1991, the plant employed 305 assembly employees. By 1995, the prod-
uct market for sport utility vehicles had boosted the plant labor force to
over 800 employees. In 1996, the bubble burst and jobs at Elsie fell
from 800 to 258, as ITT management pulled all its Chrysler work from
this plant and sent it to a sister ITT plant in Walker, Michigan, near
Grand Rapids. Another sister plant in St. Thomas, Ontario (Canada),
that did the same work as Lear–Elsie closed in 1996 due to high labor
costs. Elsie realized that it had an opportunity to become more compet-
itive by the mid 1990s, but it needed to find a way to survive. 
An additional factor in understanding this plant is the turnover in
the plant manager position. David Chambers, the current plant man-
ager since 1996, was also plant manager from 1979 to 1987. Other
plant managers served from 1987 to 1991 and from 1991 until 1996,
while Chambers’ career took him to roles as operations manager for
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five ITT plants and then as advanced engineering manager for ITT. He
chose to return to the Elsie plant in 1996 and was retained by Lear
when that company completed its purchase in 1997.
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AT LEAR–ELSIE
Today, approximately 500 workers are represented by UAW Local
1660. The union was formed as Local 1660 in 1969 and has never
merged or been amalgamated since then. There was one strike in 1979
that lasted for about 10 days over pension benefits. Use of third parties
for arbitration is rare—possibly three or four cases in the last 30 years.
The union–management relationship with ITT was seen as “arm’s
length” at best and adversarial most of the time. The company saw all
issues in terms of their business objectives. The union described this
relationship as “take, take, take” in terms of ITT behavior, and it
focused on filing grievances with little sense of any “give and take” in
the process.
The 1997 negotiations began with ITT amid a flurry of rumors that
the plant would be sold or closed. With three other ITT plants vying for
seat track work, the union felt that the company held the upper hand in
bargaining. The union had observed ITT changing its focus on automo-
tive work from aggressive pursuit of business to letting workers and
engineers be laid off. The workforce hoped for a new owner who
would keep the Elsie plant open. Lear Corporation bought the plant and
completed the negotiation process in 1997.
Lear Corporation differed from ITT in its stance toward unions. It
pledged neutrality and recognized a union that possesses 51 percent of
potential member cards stating a willingness to join that union. Fur-
thermore, Lear has stated publicly that it “liked the UAW,” and it
enjoyed a good relationship with the international union. The parties
























Employment in motor vehicle parts and accessories experienced
growth in the last two decades of the 1980s. The trend of employment
in the industry is presented in Figure 7.1. After a drop in the early
1980s, associated with the recession, employment in the industry
began to grow in 1983 and continued to grow through 2000. Over the
20-year period, total employment increased by 57.5 percent, from
approximately 349,500 to approximately 553,000. The growth rate in
production employment was slightly greater; production employment
grew by 60.5 percent, from 268,800 to 431,300. 
But this overall growth in employment presented only an opportu-
nity for the Elsie plant. There was no guarantee that all plants in the
industry would share equally in this growth, or share at all. More spe-
cifically, given the small number of purchasers of motor vehicle parts
and accessories, and the large contracts associated with those pur-
chases, a small, stand-alone plant like Lear–Elsie found itself in a con-
tinual cycle of high risk, high reward; acquisition of a large contract
meant increased employment; loss of a large contract meant a decline
in employment.
Figure 7.1 Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories, Total Employment and 
Production Employment in the United States, 1980–2000
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At the same time, global competition hit the Elsie plant in 1990–
1991. Orders appeared from Toyota and Nissan, and suddenly employ-
ees realized that they were no longer linked only to domestic automo-
tive production. At about the same time, Ford pulled its valuable
Taurus contract from Elsie and gave it to Johnson Controls. Employees
were shocked to see several lines closed. Since the plant is set up with
decoupled assembly lines for each contract, employees can easily dis-
cern exactly which contracts the plant is gaining or losing. Employees
no longer assumed that management or “someone” would always keep
the Elsie plant supplied with work. Seeing employment drop from the
800s to the 200s in 1995 and 1996 (“high risk, high reward”) demon-
strated the vulnerability of this plant, as did the closing of the St. Tho-
mas plant in Canada, and ITT’s decision to move Chrysler work to the
Walker plant.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, COMPETITIVENESS, AND 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION/CREATION: CONTRACT 
CHANGES
As noted, by the early 1990s the union at Elsie had become aware
of the importance of competition and employment protection/creation
at Elsie. These were also concerns of Lear when it assumed ownership
of the plant. Of this joint concern, almost nothing was reflected in the
formal collective bargaining agreement. Plant management stated that
it could never guarantee levels of employment or offer job security. Job
security was “based on seniority as long as the plant stays open.” Job
security was also seen as derived from “competitiveness and continu-
ous improvement” in the 1997 collective bargaining agreement. This
provision emphasizes a mutual commitment to team-based work sys-
tems, customer satisfaction, training and education for all employees,
creation of a climate of mutual dignity and respect, and use of partici-
pation to improve productivity, efficiency, quality, and cost perfor-
mance. The provision also states that employees will assume personal
responsibility and accountability for the Elsie plant’s success.
A major gain for Lear in the 1997 contract was the ability to col-
lapse six job classifications into one to gain flexibility. The union feels
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that merging assembly, maintenance, material handling, inspection,
forklift, and salvage employees into one classification overdoes the
flexibility concept and should be rethought on the next negotiation.
Lear management’s vision was comprehensive. It downloaded
quality, scrap, and cost objectives for each line to employee teams. It
changed the designation of supervisor to unit advisor and demanded
that they assume a teaching, coaching, and facilitating role with
employee teams rather than a directive role. A 1999 assessment is that
some supervisors still complain about their loss of power to direct
employees, but that this role transition has been mostly successful
except for periodic incidents of old ways of thinking. The philosophy is
that “we are all in this together,” and that everyone needs to work
together to improve multiskilled and multifunctioning employees. 
 Combined with the collapsing of six classifications into one, the
plant has gained huge cost efficiencies. The Elsie collective bargaining
agreement differs from most other Lear plants in that it does not spec-
ify production standards. Elsie management believes people in teams
working in units can do a better job of setting and achieving competi-
tive standards than by using a top-down industrial engineering
approach.
The parties did not limit themselves to competitiveness in the 1997
negotiations. A lump sum payment of $750 was provided to each
employee. In addition, the parties incorporated a “neutrality pledge” to
accept the union as a partner at Lear workplaces.
FORMAL NONCONTRACTUAL MECHANISMS
The current philosophy is anchored in a formal noncontractual par-
ticipation system. The company and union created a joint steering team
(JST) that reports to a planning team consisting of the plant manager,
plant superintendent, union president, and bargaining chair of Local
1660. The JST is a parallel organization that bridges upper leadership
to the workforce. The JST includes the plant manager, plant superin-
tendent, human resources manager, quality manager, materials man-
ager, and quality analyst. Their union counterparts on the JST are the
president, bargaining chair, and volunteers such as the statistical pro-
124 Moore and Block
cess control coordinator (SPC) and a process specialist employee from
the shop floor. The JST charters four design and development commit-
tees to serve all 14 business unit teams on the line. Design and develop-
ment function teams are staffed by at least one JST member plus
technical volunteers. Four teams are used: finance, people and groups,
equipment and facilities, and information. These teams act as in-house
consultants to help each business unit (assembly teams) with budgets,
layout, process improvements, and team issues necessary to remain
competitive and attract new business. All design and development
team projects lead to recommendations to the JST. The JST may also
create ad hoc teams to host recognition dinners, examine rewards, or to
be a community service team to help the plant support its community.
These JST mechanisms have created formal opportunities for employ-
ees to become engaged in making their business units more productive
and customer responsive.
The plant now runs as an open book and “glass wall” plant with all
cost, quality, scrap, and productivity data made available to employees
in business units. Management still reserves the right to allocate
employees across business units.
Both union and management stressed the need for training. Plant
employees indicated that they had attended courses in SPC, pull train-
ing, traceability, process analysis, QS 9000, team interaction training,
compass, and problem solving. Training may be initiated by either
management or the union; the business unit makes the decision. Both
management and the union see the current system as effective in pro-
moting competitiveness and in creating and protecting jobs. Other for-
mal but noncontractual elements of the current situation include the 40
hours guarantee, which allows employees to volunteer to work extra
hours elsewhere in the plant or just take time off if a line runs short of
materials or work during any week, and the “six pack” system, where
each business unit works on the top six line problems and issues
reported each week. The JST system is clearly evolving to meet jointly
perceived needs for competitiveness and job protection/creation.
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CREATING A FORMAL, NONCONTRACTUAL 
PARTICIPATION SYSTEM
ITT had experimented with teams since the mid 1980s and had
focused on individual skill training. Team roll-outs failed twice. But
plant management and the union learned together how to build a suc-
cessful participation system. They read books on teams, worked with
private consultants, and jointly benchmarked firms such as Johnson-
ville Sausage, Sealed Power, Saturn, and Delphi-Saginaw, firms
known for having successfully installed team-based work systems.
Company and union leadership attended seminars on team develop-
ment offered at North Texas State University. New union leadership
and the return of David Chambers as plant manager were seen as plus-
ses in terms of consistent leadership of this competitive effort. The
plant experimented with new work system concepts until it reached a
workable solution for the Elsie work context.
COMPETITION AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION/
CREATION WITHIN DIFFERING MANUFACTURING 
PARADIGMS
The Elsie plant of the Lear Corporation and Local 1660 of the
UAW have had to bargain competitiveness, employment security, and
growth issues in the context of major changes in the manufacturing
systems of the plant. These three manufacturing systems or paradigms
are those of: 1) mass production (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990); 2)
sociotechnical systems production (Trist and Bamforth 1951; Niepce
and Molleman 1998); and 3) lean manufacturing (Ohno 1988; Kenney
and Florida 1993; Womack and Jones 1996). Each system differs in
fundamental dimensions from the others. These manufacturing systems
will be discussed in turn and related to the business context and the col-
lective bargaining relationship at the Elsie plant.
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MASS PRODUCTION AT LEAR–ELSIE
Mass production is based upon the ability of a system to standard-
ize outputs from a manufacturing or service process. It is an American
system that spread around the world from 1915 to the present, and until
the late 1980s, received few challenges from competing systems. Mass
production is based on the principle of economies of scale. Its compo-
nents include functional specialization, infrequent job rotation, tightly
supervised machine-paced work, many job classifications, and prob-
lem solving by manufacturing and staff (engineering, accounting, pro-
duction control, labor relations, quality, and human resources, to name
a few). It also utilizes a deskilled workforce, work standards imposed
on workers, seniority as the basis for wages and promotion, arm’s-
length relationships with suppliers, and adversarial labor relations. The
general objective of mass production was creation of products of “good
enough” quality and to maintain large inventories as buffers against
machine or worker problems. While mass production can be employed
with management styles ranging from coercive to enlightened, it still
represents a problematic manufacturing model in the twenty-first cen-
tury.
The Lear–Elsie plant was run by several owners as a mass produc-
tion facility until the mid 1990s. Management was in control of the
plant, and workers received little training, did not work in teams,
received little information about quality, and were tightly supervised.
Employment at the Elsie plant fluctuated wildly as it competed with
other plants to be awarded lines of business. While unionized since
1969, the relationship was characterized by company “take-away’s”
according to the union. The basic hope of the union was that a more
enlightened owner would purchase the plant. When the Lear Corpora-
tion purchased the plant in 1997, it brought a new manufacturing para-
digm plus a plant manager who knew and respected the plant and its
people. The new manufacturing paradigm of team-based work systems
closely followed the sociotechnical systems model.
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SOCIOTECHNICAL TEAM-BASED SYSTEMS AT 
LEAR–ELSIE
The team-based “sociotechnical” systems (STS) bargained in the
1997 contract by plant manager David Chambers were American but
were built heavily on ideas first tested in England (Trist and Bamforth
1951) and northern Europe (Berggren 1992). These systems were
designed to create high levels of worker satisfaction, which was
believed to lead to high levels of quality production and retention of
workers. These STS approaches grouped employees into large teams,
changed the role of supervisor into more of a group facilitator, incorpo-
rated team process skills and quality skills into the training of all group
members, and led to frequent team meetings to discuss plant perfor-
mance—the “glass wall” concept. The union was accepted by manage-
ment as a partner rather than an adversary, and its opinion was sought
on all workplace changes. Ergonomics received new attention, and
workers were given more freedom to design and schedule tasks as long
as quality standards and productivity standards were met. Employees
were urged to deeply identify with their team and the product it pro-
duced for each of the contracts in the plant.
This STS story is largely the story told in this case, which portrays
the successful shift to a team-based work system; improved worker,
management, and union attitudes; a successful contract negotiation in
1997; and the general prosperity of the plant. The team-based system
was seen by all as incorporating the elements necessary to maintain a
competitive posture and to secure jobs for the Elsie plant for the fore-
seeable future. The case ended with appreciation for the versatility of
the collective bargaining process and noncontractual arrangements in
securing a positive future for the Elsie plant, its union, and its work-
force. However, in a surprising turn of events, an interview conducted
in 2001 indicated that the plant had largely discarded this paradigm and
had shifted to lean manufacturing in 2000, thus removing many team-
based elements from the contract bargained by Lear and UAW Local
1660.
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LEAN MANUFACTURING AT LEAR–ELSIE
The lean manufacturing system originated in Asia as the Toyota
Production System created by Taiichi Ohno (1988). Lean manufactur-
ing became known to the West when popularized by the International
Motor Vehicle Program at MIT. The book The Machine That Changed
the World (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990) startled U.S. and Euro-
pean mass producers by showing that lean principles allow factories to
operate with half the space of comparable mass production facilities.
Further, lean plants showed only half the defects found in mass prod-
ucts, used half the hours of human effort, needed only one-tenth the
amount of in-process inventory, and reduced product development
times by one-third. The best European STS plants were shown to be
nearly one-third less efficient than lean plants in Japan and those of
Japanese transplants in the United States. Controversy arose immedi-
ately as intellectuals of the STS orientation (Berggren 1992; Van
Eijnatten, Hoevenaars, and Rutte 1992; Fucini and Fucini 1990; Parker
and Slaughter 1995) launched attacks on lean manufacturing as simply
being an advanced form of “Fordism.” Lean advocates (Adler and Cole
1993) responded that lean plants could not only out-produce other par-
adigms, but that the secret of the lean approach was in its superior way
of promoting organizational learning through its standardized work
systems and team-based suggestion systems. This is the direction taken
by the Elsie plant in 2000.
The lean system at Lear–Elsie is a close fit with lean principles
(Ohno 1988). Chambers felt that the STS-type large teams had become
too independent and rigid. They set up boundaries and isolated them-
selves from other plant teams. Their working autonomy was not trans-
lated into sharing ideas to help the plant but instead to become more
impervious to ideas from others in the plant. These comments echo the
Adler and Cole (1993) comments about the downsides of the STS team
systems. In contrast, lean teams are small and are led by team leaders;
they are not “semi-autonomous” but are tightly linked to other teams
on their line. Lean is characterized by “andon” systems (which allow
workers to stop the line in the event of materials shortage or quality
problem), standardized work, just-in-time inventory and material han-
dling systems, quick team meetings, and a focus on eliminating waste.
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“Kaizen” (continuous improvement) events are used for extensive pro-
cess and quality assessment of specific target areas in the plant. All of
these systems and processes have been installed at the Lear–Elsie plant
since 2000. The union allowed the company to remove many of the
team concepts and install lean principles in order to support manage-
ment’s goal of keeping the facility competitive. According to Cham-
bers, the UAW Local 1660 leaders were somewhat cynical that lean
production was simply a new “flavor of the month,” but they had built
up enough trust in management after the 1997 contract to be willing to
negotiate a shift to lean manufacturing. The union felt that both
approaches are team-based and that team concepts were supported by
the membership.
The lean system is already producing successes for the Elsie plant.
Plant in-process inventory has dropped 22 percent. Four kaizen events
have been held. Employees are contributing a steady flow of sugges-
tions. “Glass-wall” knowledge of plant functioning is still shared with
all employees. Employees have been trained in the seven types of
waste and how to use the “5’s” model of workplace organization.
Cross-functional teams are extensively used to solve problems and
ensure the sharing of best practices and ideas. The Elsie plant has suc-
cessfully launched new product lines and has reached productivity and
quality performance levels faster than ever before. Plant employment
levels have been maintained. The plant’s layout and footprint are the
current constraints to future growth, but upcoming kaizen events are
seen as likely to create improved space utilization so new product lines
can be attracted to the plant. By having the courage to use the collec-
tive bargaining process to make a successful team-based plant even
better, the union and the company have exemplified the creativity and
flexibility necessary to keep a small auto supplier plant economically
competitive and able to sustain employment levels in a small rural
community.
CONCLUSION
In an industry with growing employment overall, but with the pos-
sibility of unstable employment at any single facility, competitiveness
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means appropriating for that plant a share of the overall industry
employment gains. In 1999 and in 2001, this plant was working at
capacity with new jobs scheduled to replace jobs that will be closed out
due to decisions made about the product’s life cycle by automotive
manufacturers. Both management and union report that most employ-
ees are happy with the plant today and are pleased with its competitive
position and its future likelihood of job protection and creation. Man-
agement spokespersons see a complete turnaround by both sides. Ten
years ago, employee complaints were met with the statement “go write
a grievance.” Five years ago, management would take the time to argue
but would still resolve matters by telling the union to “go write a griev-
ance.” Today the situation is characterized as both sides being willing
to admit it if they are wrong. Plus, both sides are likely to give each
other some leeway because trust has been established. Management
recognizes it is always fighting inertia and resistance to change from
both supervisors/unit advisors and employees. Union reservations to
agree to total success of this system stem from the company’s use of
bargaining power in the 1997 negotiation and the resulting classifica-
tion collapse. The union believes the process of getting competitive
could have been handled better.
Management and union seem to agree that sharing information
makes everyone hungry to learn even more about the business and to
become multiskilled and even more knowledgeable about the competi-
tive global environment. Both are also likely to believe that Elsie was
fortunate to have Chambers return as plant manager and point to his
engineering background, product knowledge, benchmarking experi-
ence in Europe, Japan, and the United States, plus his vision and people
skills. He earns approval by his willingness to aggressively pursue
business for Lear–Elsie.
Finally, both union and management express appreciation for the
institution of collective bargaining as a way to forge new relationships
and to create new participation mechanisms necessary to foster compe-
tition and to protect and create jobs in response to global competitive
pressures. The Elsie plant’s ability to illustrate the worldwide search
for an optimum manufacturing paradigm while fully utilizing collec-
tive bargaining and noncontractual mechanisms makes this an impor-
tant case study. This small North American plant exemplifies the
global search for methods of achieving competitiveness while main-
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taining employment levels. In that sense, the Lear plant in Elsie repre-
sents a prototypical example of a unionized facility attempting to
maintain employment in the United States.
Note
The authors would like to thank the interviewees cited in the chapter.
Unless otherwise noted parenthetically in the text, the material in this chapter is based
on Chambers and Laxton (1999), Rathbun and Tyler (1999), Jordan and Klatt (1999),
Jablowski (1999), and Chambers (2001).
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